Ideals and Obligations in Plato\u27s Ethics by Moravcsik, Julius M.E.
Binghamton University
The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB)
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
3-22-1984
Ideals and Obligations in Plato's Ethics
Julius M.E. Moravcsik
Stanford University
Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp
Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Ancient
Philosophy Commons, and the History of Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in The
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter by an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more
information, please contact ORB@binghamton.edu.
Recommended Citation
Moravcsik, Julius M.E., "Ideals and Obligations in Plato's Ethics" (1984). The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter. 114.
https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/114
IDEALS AND OBLIGATIONS IN PLATO)S ETHICS*
Thrasymachus' manifesto in the REPUBLIC is one of the most discussed 
texts in the history of ethics. Generations of philosophers have wondered 
if his amoral stance is really refuted by Plato's answer. In order to un­
derstand the answer we must first come to understand Thrasvmachus. Even a 
cursory perusal should convince us that his position is more than a mere 
attempt at defining justice or rightness . The oft quoted slogan "justice is 
what is in the interest of the stronger" hides an anal|ysi« that can be best 
labelled as moral scepticism. For Thrasymachus argues (338el-339a*0 "that 
all this talk about justice and its rational foundation is empty. What we 
call justice i« really a set of injunctions that those with power force upon 
us. This is not a definition, but rather a sceptical explanation of the data 
that philosophical definitions try to analyze. A modern statement of Thrasy­
machus’ position would be: "what we all callpjustice is in fact nothing but 
whatever persons with power impose upon us."^ If Thrasymachus is right, then 
there is no rational foundation for justice and rightness. Ethicrs should be 
replaced by a branch of political science that studies power and predict« 
or explains domination in different societies.
One would expect Plato to reply to Thrasymachus by showing that justice 
and morality can be given rational foundation«, and that invoking these 
notions is not just a sham perpetrated on us by the mighty. But this i« not 
what Plato does. Instead, he leads Tharsymachu« to commit himself to further 
claims. In particular, he elicits from Thrasymachus a description of the 
life-ideal that he professes (3^3d-3^hl). This is the ideal of the tyrant, 
or the strong and powerful person.
This move should give us pause. For there is no logical link between the 
two theses. Moral scepticism is compatible with any number of life-ideals.
I might agree, for example, that all this talk about what is right is 
merely a manifestation of what the ruining classes want, and then go on to 
proclaim as my life-ideal that of a quiet retiring individual with a few 
gentle pleasures and with no intention to dominate anybody.
Our key questions, then, should be: a) Why does Plato link Thrasymachus' 
moral scepticism to a certain life-ideal? and b) how does he reply to these 
two theses?
Many modern discussions assume, that Plato's task is to challenge the 
claim that justice leads to misery and injustice leads to happines«. In the 
course of working out this scheme modern interpreters have to come to grips 
with the fact that Plato describes a certain inner psychological condition 
as justice, and thus needs to connect this notion of justice with the notion 
of justice as meeting one's obligations. Other interpreters try to show that 
Plato defends the notion of just and fair dealings with others as intrin­
sically good, regardless of consequences for one's own happiness or that of 
others.
If Plato's reply is to show that justice pays rather than injustice, 
then he is an early example of a kind of utilitarianism. If he is showing thf
justice is intrinsically good, hut in fact makes us also happv, then he is
a Kantian with an additional - dubious - psychological thesis.
If one is to think that these are the only alternatives, then one is
tacitly subscribing to a typical çonception çf ethicsk held in modern times 
according to which the main questions of ethics are those of utility and
obligation; and depending on how one links these two, one is a deontologist 
or a utilitarian. But not all ethical theories contain only these two 
components. For specifying utility must assume some answer to the question: 
"useful to whom, or to what kind of a person?" Thus a complete ethical
theory must have three components. A) A substantive theory of the Good
(^tg from here on); i.e. a theory that specifies what it is to be human, 
and what it is to be a flourishing human. B) A theory of utility fov the
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individual and for collectives that specifies means to the substantive 
good, and ways of calculating the means. Ill· A theory of obligations both 
in terms of bonds between individuals, and $n terms of societal links such 
as the distribution of goods, and the acceptance of rights.
A good example of a modern ethical theory that contains all three parts 
is that of John Rawls . In the first two parts of his book Rawls develops 
the notion of justice as fairness, and in the third part he presents his 
STG. As Rawls’ theory shows, a rational foundation for claims about justice 
has to indicate what the justifications of these claims are, and how these 
are related to questions of utility and an adequate STG. An STG may be a 
"thin" theory or one with much content. Even a hedonist has an STG, though 
a "thin" one. According to the STG of a hedonist, a flourishing human being 
is a creature that can and should have pleasures, and this capacity of his 
is of supreme importance. We shall see why Plato rejects this STG.
An STG may be related to matters of obligation in different ways. 
Typically, the connection will follow utilitarian or non-utilitarian lines.
As we shall see, however, other alternatives are also open.
This paper has two main claims. First, it will argue that most of 
what is usually interpreted as Plato's ethics is concerned primarily with 
the establishing of an STG. Secondly, it will be shown that Plato’s link 
between his STG sind matters of obligation is a very close one, and cannot 
be analyzed either along utilitarian or Kantian lines.
If one is to interpret Plato's ethics along the lines suggested, one 
arrives at the. following outline of the REPUBLIC. The argument starts with 
two claims of Thrasymachus* i) moral scepticism and ii) the tyrannical S^G. 
Plato's reply starts already in 353d3-35^a9 (Bk.I.). He points out that 
since humans form a natural species, they must have certain natural functions 
and capacities ("erga"). The point of this passage is to shift the discussior 
from the question of what should be Thrasymachus' individual ^TG to what 
should be the STG of a human. Plato thinks that any rational person will 
accept this shift. Since we. are humans, we should be interested in the 
substantive STG of a human. Plato may be oversimplifying things. Is there 
not a sense in which one could says "So I am a member of the human species.
So what? Why should I devote my life to developing those characteristics 
that would m4ke me an outstanding member of the species? Maybe I have more 
important aims? (While Plato may have h y k x h s underestimated the force of 
such an "existential outcry", we should not underestimate the potential 
of an adequate response to such outcry.)
In Bk.IV. Plato gives the outline of his STG. This is his famous theory 
of the flourishing soul as inner harmony (^36a8-*j44a2 ). Inner harmony for 
Plato includes a certain dominant role for reason. This role can be under­
stood only if we see in the bàckground of REPUBLIC IV the philosophical 
psychology developed in the SYMPOSIUM. In 442e^-i|43b5 Plato maintains also 
that a person with the right STG will adopt the attitude and conduct 
required by justice; i.e. the notion that encompasses our obligations and 
fairness towards others.
Books V-VII explain and justify the metaphysical and epistemological 
premisses involved in Plato's STG. In Books VIII and IX Plato compares his 
STG with alternatives and concludes not only that his STG is superior, but 
also that a person living according to this ideal will have his own enjoy­
ments.
One argument for adopting this interpretation is that following the 
outline sketched here enables us to construct a much better detailed inter­
pretation of the REPUBLIC than what we can achieve if we follow the assum­
ptions adopted by those who try to forte Plato into the utilitarian or 
deontologist moulds.
There is, however, one passage that has crucial direct bearing on our
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question. In 357cl-358a3 Plato considers whether a notion like justice 
should be shown to be good for its consequences, or for its intrinsic 
merits, or on both counts. Those who think that Plato must have been a 
utilitarian or a deontologist, and that he is facing here this option, 
find it puzzling that Plato undertakes showing justice to be good on both 
counts. If he is a deontologist, he must be overplaying his hand, and. if he 
is a utilitarian, then he must be inconsistent. But the difficulties wmth 
these modern interpretations go deeper than this quandary. For it is clear 
from the passage that Plato regards it as a real advantage if he can show 
justice to be good on both counts. This makes no sense if Plato was thinking 
either in the utilitarian or the Kantian frameworks. It makes, however, very 
good sense if we assume that Plato is considering here justice as a potential 
ingredient of his STG. For within an STG one wants to specify a basic or 
primary set of goods in terms of which the healthy and flourishing hufcçàn is 
spelled out, and on© wants to show also what some of the cosequences of 
such an STG will be . Unless we wish to assume that Plato did not understand 
l$s own theory at all, we should start out at least initiallv with the 
hypothesis that the main parts of the REPUBLIC are devoted to spelling out 
the Platonic STG. He does not attack Thrasymachus* moral scepticism directly. 
Instead, he presents his own STG, and shows Thrasymachus* candidate to be 
inadequate. He then goes on to show a close link between the adequate S^G 
and moral conduct.
At this point we should try to understand why Plato insists that 
Thrasymachus must have an STG. Plato seems to assume that anvone with a 
full set of principles for conduct will have, explicitly or otherwise, an 
STG. Though Plato gives no argument for this assumption, there are enough 
hints in the text to provide a basis for reconstructing the tacitly assumed 
argument. Plato sees that everyone addressing questions of right choice must’ 
assume some conception of the self as an acting agent, and that such a con­
ception must be partly normative. The reasoning behind this thought is the 
following. One can try to explain human nature from an observer's point-of 
view. Onr would eventually arrive at a characterization that would form the 
basis for predictions about human behaviour. Plato, however, does not stait 
from this point of view. Plato, starts from the point of view of
the acting agent askings "what shall I do?" In order to give a rational 
answer to this que$tion one must have a conception of the self with built- 
in priorities. A conception of the self without priorities would have to be 
a list of all of the parts, attributes, as well as trivial details of life 
history. Without priorities one might end up sacrificing one's emotional 
capacities for the sake of a toe, or one's ability to cooperate for the sake 
of a fleeting moment of pleasure. We must assume that some parts and attri­
butes are more important than others. Up to a point biology helps us to 
set the priorities. It tells us that the heart more important than the 
finger-nails and the brain is more important than hair. But this leaves u·3 
with a lot of slack, and attempts to squeeze out priorities from allegedly 
analytic delineations of what it is to be a human stilly leaves us without 
guidance for cases in which we must choose between feelings of attachment 
and the development of competitive excellences. Yet these are what William 
James would have called "forced options" for humans. An agent is a planning 
creature, and plans presuppose some overall scheme of priorities among 
human parts and attributes. The way Plato describes the acting and choosing 
agent suggests that thiQ is roughly the line of reasoning that he assumes 
as background. His STG as inner harmony with reason "in control" is at once 
a specification of a flourishing human and a characterization of the basic 
priorities that a rational planning agent should assume. For Plato all 
questions of utility are relative to this conception. Thrasymachus too has 
an STG. He thinks that the primary goods are pleasure, and power. Piatn 
challenges Thrasymachus· notion of poWer (_
•I) and provides a different S'T’G.
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As we noted above, Plato does not give much of an explanation of how 
the STG is linked to public morality. He asserts that a human with the right 
STG will riot commit acts of unfairness and injustice towards others. Hence 
one should, consider a few ways of filling out the argument.
Al. This supplementary argument could be captured bv the slogans 
"inner harmony leads to harmony with others." Thus construed Plato advances 
here a psychological thesis. It would asert that a person whose inner har­
mony allows reason to specify ends, whose desires and attitudes are lead 
by reason (i.e. the objects of the desires will have characteristics that 
warrant the desires or attitudes in question) and whose reason spells out 
both the constituents and appropriate means for a flourishing life, wilîjnot 
have desires or attitudes determining his actions that would lead, to immo­
rality.
A2. Plato might have thought that a person' with the right STG, i.e. the 
inner harmony spelled out above, would find public moralitv to be useful.
A3· The tacit Platonic argument could be that persons with the right 
STG require (or necessarily constitute) a kind of community for which moral 
conduct is essential.
Of these alternatives A2 is the weakest candidate. For though acting 
with fairness to others would be much preferable from the point of view of 
maintaining the STS than acting immorally, the moral conduct misht have 
such sources as benevolence or sympathy, and under certain circumstances 
these sources take attention away from the pursuit of reason and under­
standing. The most that one could say is that acting with unfairness towards 
others would turn the soul away from the pursuit of the right qTG. ^hus 
A2 gives us a negative reason? i.e. one that says why a human is being harmed 
by immorality. A2 does not give us grounds for pursuing the positive things 
that go into being a human who is fair and meets obligations.
This negativity carries over also to some extent to Al. It is easy to 
^how that under normal circumstances a person with the Platonic STG would not 
have interest in acts like murder and adultery. It is much less easy to show 
41lat such a person might never resort to such activities, even if in some 
contexts these could be shown to be the least disastrous means to securing 
the pursuit of understanding. Also, Al does not say anything about the kinds 
of conflicts in which increasing my knowledge and rationality clashes with 
the development of rationality in others. Al could be invoked to show that 
the Platonically good person would not be possessive. This is, however, not 
the same as showing that such a person would have basic respect for others.
It seems, then, that from the point of view of a Platonistic Philosoph 
A3 would be the most appropriate candidate for filling out the argument 
linking the STG with public morality. Plato believes that the development 
of rationality and understanding is a necessarily cooperative enterprise.
For Plato self knowledge involves understanding the rationality that is 
within a person, and thi^ - in his view - requires a community. Further­
more valuing rationality leads - according to Plato - to a desire to maxi­
mize its instantiations. This again requires a community. Thus the establi­
shing and maintaining of inner harmony requires a community. This community 
is based on shared ideáis and cooperative enterprises. Members of this 
community would see each other as partners and contributors in the project 
of increasing knowledge and rational control in humans. Regarding each other 
in this manner would constitute the basis for mutual respect and taking inte­
rest in the welfare of all members of the communitv. Without such respect andf 
interest one would cut oneself off from sources of self knowledge and from
the context within which the pursued values can be maximized.
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We know from Thrasymachus' case that Plato’s response to persons with the 
wrong STG is education. But Plato is silent on what to do if education does 
not help, and persons like Thrasymachus threaten the Platonic communi+y. Nor 
does Plato say much about distributions of goods and the assignments of 
rights. One can see, however, that in a Platonic community these would not 
be issues of paramount importance.
As we saw, A1 is a psychological thesis while A3 is a conceptual claim. 
While A3 seems to be the best candidate for closing the gap in the argument, 
xixix there is a real possibility that Plato did not distinguish sharply 
between A1 and A3·
Regardless of whether he opted for A1 or A3, within Plato’s framework 
the simple questions "does justice pay?" makes no sense. Only when provided 
with proper qualifications does the question become worthy of reply. There 
are at least five qualified versions of the question that merit some conside­
ration.
VI. "Does justice, in the sense of acting morally towards others, pay?"
This question arises only if Plato were to construe the link between his 
STG and morality along the lines of A2. We saw already that this is an implau­
sible interpretation.
V2. "Should justice in the sense of acting morally be a part of an 
adequate STG?"
We saw that Plato spells out his STG in terms of what we are and 
should be, and not in terms of what we do. Thus it is unlikely that Plato 
would have considered this question. He would have been more interested in 
showing that acting morally is a consequence of his STG.
V3. "does inner harmony - as part of the adequate STG - pay?"
This question is senseless for Plato, because one cannot ask whether an 
STG or one of its parts "pays". For the STG is a partial specification of 
the agent in the context of the questions "is x useful to a human?" If one 
construed inner harmony as one of those things that can be judged useful or 
harmful, then one would have to ask once mores "useful to whom'5" or "useful 
to what kind of person?" and this question would demand further specification· 
of the flourishing human agent. This regress has to stop somewhere. For Plato 
it stops with inner harmony as his STG, for Rawls it stops with his theory of 
the good that includes rationality and self respect. If one construed V3 as 
asking whether inner harmony brought pleasure, then one would be tacitly 
embracing a non-Platonic STG, namely one which specifies the gaining of 
pleasure as the key ingredient in an STG.
V^. "Should justice in the sense of inner harmony be a part of an 
adequate STG?"
Since the answer to this question is Plato’s defense of hi* STG and his 
comparisons with alternative STG’s, the answer would be neither utilitarian, 
nor Kantian. When Rawls says that "humans should be rational" or Plato 
says that "humans should have inner harmony", they are using ’should" in a 
sense that is neither utilitarian nor a ’should’ of obligation. This ’should’ 
indicates not utility or obligation, but the ’should’ in terms of which one 
spells out what it ίς· to be a well functioning human agent relative to whom 
questions of utility can be raised and relative to whom obligations are 
specified.
V5. "Is the life of a person with inner harmony more enjoyable than 
the lives of persons with different STG’s?"
This question assumes that one can compare different types of 
pleasures across the board. Thus one way of diffusing V5 would involve 
showing that the Plátonically good person enjoy* life but that these enjoy­
ments differ qualitatively from enjoyments to be had while following other 
STG’s, and that in fact different STG’s are likely to involve pleasures that 
do not allow mere quantitative comparison. Another way to deal with V5 would
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take some sense of 'pleasure’ that people on a pre-analytical common sense 
level can agree on, and then show that in this sense of ’pleasure* the 
Platonically good person ejoys life more than persons with alternative 
s’l’G ’s. ‘This would have to be argued as an independent psychological thesis; 
it is not required by nor does it follow from the adequate specification of 
an STG.·
Thus we see that of the various versions only. and V5 make sense for 
Plato. In showing different ways of dealing with V5 we have gone bevond the 
texts. Indeed, one might argue that the failure to distinguish clearly ^ 
between the different possible responses to V5 underlies some of the con£ptual 
obscurities of the arguments tkw towards the end of Book IX. In any case, 
we see that the only versions of the ”justice4pays" principle that make sense 
for Plato leave him as not committed to hedon$$m or to consequentialism in 
general.
So far we have discussed Plato's STG without having examined in detail 
its content. One of its key features is the condition that reason must 
"rule" over the soul. Unpacking thi$ metaphor will considerable insight
into this STG. *
We can say initially that according to Plato the control of reason 
involves our emotions, feelings, attitudes, and desires having their proper 
objects. This requirement needs justification. Why should we not say that 
any desire or emition should be satisfied or fulfilled as long as such 
proceses will bring pleasure? Plato's reply has two parts. In his examination? 
of pleasure in the GORGIAS and the PHILSBUS he posits „
PI. The plasticity of human nature. A human can experience enjoyment 
in connection with a wide variety of activities, and can change his inner 
state so as to alter the sources for his enjoyment.
Thu«* for example if a person enjoys eating a lot and subsequently convin­
ces himself that this is bad for him, he can not only change his eating habit? 
but can also become a person who enjoys eating less and only helthy food. 
Again, if a person enjoys dominating others and convinces himself that it 
would be better to lead a life of cooperation and sharing, then such a person 
is able to change his desires and emotions so that he will enjov the sharing 
and the cooperation.
This shows that Plato ha¿ a dynamic view of human enjoyment. According to 
the static conception humans have a basic set of pleasures and enjoyments 
that correspond to fixed needs, and our task is simply to seek the best means 
for the meeting of these needs. The dynamic conception sees most human needs 
as dependent on our conceptions of ourselves. Changes in outlook and perso­
nality can change needs and hence sources of enjoyment.
PI. states a psychological fact. It does not lead, by itself, to a
normative critique of possible objects for desires or emotions. In ord^r to
lay the foundation of siich a critique, we need the conjunction of PI and
another principle:
P2. Not all objects of desire or attitude are of equal worth.
For Plato a rational life involves enjoying those things that one 
values as well. PI. tells us that we can change our sources of enjoyment, 
and P2 tells us that such changes can be undertaken from the point of view 
of proper evaluations.
Plato’s theory of rational desires is assumed in the middle books of 
the REPUBLIC. The details are laid out in SYMPOSIUM 210-212, the famous 
passage of the ascent to Beauty.
A key condition for the understanding of this text is the realization 
that Plato uses 'eros' to denote a generic relation which includes what we 
would call desire, attitude, love, aspiration, and interest. Plato draws 
these distinctions sole\y in terms of the differentiations of objects for 
eros.
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0 /ln modern philosophy we differentiate different desires', attrtudes, and 
enytions either in terms of causal mechanisms that bring these about®, or 
in terms of introspectively registered qualities. Plato rejects in+rospection 
as a reliable guide for mental topography, and he does not know of causal 
mechanisms of the required sort; hence his reliance on objectual differen­
tiations. His theory has advantages when applied to certain mental states.
His is a "magnet-theory" of eros, for he sees objects of various states or 
dispositions as magnets that can evoke various attitudes. The purely objec­
tual specifications require us to translate one Greek word, ’eros’ with a 
variety of English expressions such as desire, love, liking, attitude, 
emotion, aspiration or interest. The ddvantage of Plato’s theory is tha+ 
he can explain shifts between these non-rational states as the agent moves 
his attention from one object to the other. The framework is also advan+ageou? 
when it comes to accounting for intellectual interest. Platonic "eros" for 
mathematics i«? being interested in mathematics. We know of no causal mechanisr 
that will explain the rise of intellectual interest, and introspectively re­
gistered qualities do not enable us to demarcate the various intellectual 
interests of a person. Finally, Plato can point to a common element that 
even within the modern framework all types of "ero5" share. For each of these 
involve valuing (or "holding dear" "philein") an object.
Plato sets up a general framework for rational "eros" and then within 
this he has more specific proposals. A rational "eros" in the general sense 
of this notion has the following structure?
person P has eros E towards an object x in virtue of x ’s characteristic
C ,  C", ...Cn '
where the attribute-set is a subset of the total attributes of x.(In order 
to simplify exposition, we shall make the obviously unrealistic assumption 
that the eros is in virtue of one attribute Cn). "he "in virtue of" link 
is to show that though Cn may play a causal role in the development of 
E, its primary role is that of justification. So thi^ type of eros is to be 
contrasted with those in which Cn might play a causal r¿>le in the development 
of E, it would not be invoked by the agent as justification.
Plato’s special thesis within this general framework is that only certair 
attributes can function as adequate justifications. For example, one can 
admire another person for the right or for the wrong reasons. "he same can be 
said for desires, interest, etc. Thus reason rules the soul when eros deve­
lops in a rational manner - as specified above - and +he eros-grounding 
attributes are the appropriate ones. Discovering new attributes in an^objcet 
opens up the possibility of new evaluations, and hence new "eros". ^his is, 
then, the first part of Plato’s theory. The second part involves progression 
through four stages. This too is an integral part of the notion of inner 
harmony. We start with
51. P has E towards x in virtue of Cn.
It is clear both from the SYMPOSIUM and the REPUBLIC that Plato is consi­
dering this case under idealized circumstances. We must assume, foÆxample, 
that the eros developed solely in virtue of the recognition and valuation 
of Cn, and that x has no attributes that would cancel out Cn’s magnetism. 
Furthermore, if Cn is the right kind of attribute than it must lead to or 
be a constituent of what Plato regards as goodness. Finally, the history of 
our relationship with x is ignored, and so are possibilities of reciprocity, 
limitations on information, attention span, and the limits of our energies.
Understood this way SI leads to x ’s particularity dropping out of the 
picture. The only relevant condition for E is that the object has Cn. Hence 
Plato assumes that the rational person will move from SI to
52. P has E towards all and any x that has Cn.
For once we focus on the attribute that makes x a suitable object for E, 
we can generalize and see that under the appropriate idealization^, any+hing 
possessing the right attribute will serve as the object of E.
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By abstracting away not only from the uniqueness of any one x that has 
Cn, but also from the fact thst Cn happens to have instances, Plato expects 
the good human to arrive ats.
S3· P has 5 towards Cn.
This grates on the modern ear. One can admire all persons of courage, 
but how can we admire courage itself? Our difficulties, however, may stem 
from an overly restricted interpretation of eros. is more plausible if 
we take it to be basically valuation or interest. If I value courageous 
persons, then I value courage. If I take án interest in all beautiful things,
.then, given the idealization conditions mentioned above, I will take an 
\mterest in beauty. There are three reasons why Plato wants to go beyond S2 
and move to S3· One of these is the metaphysics within which the theory is 
couched. The other is that this enables Plato to deal with the fact that 
Forms are only contingently instantiated. If my interest in would be restric­
ted to beautiful things, then I would have no interest in beauty when it is 
not instantiated. Thirdly, it is S3 rather than c2 that leads to:
S^. If P has S towards Cn, then P wants Cn to have as many instances 
as possible (or: P wants "as much Cn as possible").
This step captures the steps of creation that are parts of the ascent 
of the SYMPOSIUM, and gives for these motivation. We move from S3 to S^, 
because if we have a real interest in Cn and value it highly, +hen - ceteris 
paribus - we will want "as„much of it as possible"; i.e. have it instantiated 
as !4âany times as possible.' If one values courage, then one wants as many 
instances of it as possible. Furthermore, our interest at this stage is in 
having Cn instantiated at any time and in any place. The interest i° not 
restricted to wanting instances for ourselves.
The eros developed at this stage is neither egoistic nor altruistic.
In the early stage we have an egoistic eros; we want something for ourselves. 
But as we concentrate on the reason that leads us from one eros to the 
other, we leave egoism behind. Our eros comes to have first a more generalized 
and then a more abstract object, and it makes no sense to want an attribute 
all to oneself. If we have a genuine interest in an attribute, then we would 
not want to be its sole insurance.
The process is cumulative. As we move along, we do not abandon the 
previous objects of ero®. If I desire healthy food, then eventually the 
Platonic theory of how reason should control my attitudes will lead me to 
wanting healthy food in the world in general. This does not mean that I don't 
want healthy food formyself.
The attribute C^ i is in some cases, as the example of healthy food 
shows, a species of a larger genus. There are species d# beauty, health, 
knowledge, etc. in the development of understanding, these relationships 
will be’discovered. This should lead to the appropriate modifications of 
eros. Thus there is a general condition of E-development:
S5. If P has E towards Cn, and Cn is a "part" o^ kind of a more 
generic Form C, then P will have E also towards C.
Thus, for example, we move from eros towards a certain kind of beauty 
to eros for beauty itself.
Let us take again the example of healthy food. Starting with a desire 
for healthy food, I come to form a certain attitude towards all healthy 
things, and eventually towards health itself. I will then want to see as 
much health in the world as possible. Of course, one needs to add that my 
desires need to be compatible with each other, and that other considerations 
might constrain my efforts -to have more health in the world.
I might also develop a yearning for having ExfKiKudx someone as a friend. 
This should lead me to wanting anyone with those attributes as a friend, and 
eventually I should be led to the point of seeing the value of friendship, an^ 
M n<Bfiew^ôiHSal0pK§?ïbiewards there being, as many friends and friendship
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Alternatively, one might become interested in a mathematical proof because 
of its abstractness, explanatory power, and elegance. One would then generaliz 
the object of interest to anything with those attributes, and after one has 
focussed on the attributes themselves, one would want to create as many ins­
tances of elegant mathematical proofs as possible. Similar considerations will 
bear on examples involving admiration or approval.
As we can see, Platonic eros is not the eros of a consumer. Ordinarily 
we think of a person who desires food as someone who wants food for himself 
and once he has it he consumes it. But the Platonic person, though he will no+ 
starve, will go further than that. Having enjoyed the food, he will focus on 
its good making characteristics, and after the generalization of the object 
of eros he will take an interest in the goodness of the product and will want 
to have as much of it available to mankind; as possible. In the case of the 
objects of noetic interest the matter of consumer-attitude does not arise, 
since these objects cannot be consumed in any clear sense. More than one 
person can work on the same mathematical proof, but only one person can consum 
a given portion of food.
The Platonic analysis of eros works best for attitudes like interest, 
admiration, or approval. Plato probably did think that all of the different 
types of eros should culminate in intellectual interest, or at least that 
intellectual interest should, be the highest form of eros, even if we do keep 
all of the other types.
We can see how egocentricity is dissolved even in the case of the 
other types of eros. If I want money because it makes me happv, then I will 
- on reflexion - want everything that makes me happv. But if happiness is 
something objectively valuable, then I should be interested in it, and thus 
in its spseading as far as possible, regardless of whether it is mv happines- 
or that of others that is being promoted.
This analysis of the Platonic attitudes helps us to understand what it 
is for reason to "rule". The Platonic ^TG assigns to rfta^on the following 
rules* a) reason fixes ultimate ends since it shows us what has objec+ive 
value°b) reason informes our attitudes in the manner specified above c) by 
informing our attitudes it enables these to counteract impulses and appetites 
d) it elicits intellectual interest from the healthy person.
At least three factors should be mentioned that Plato invokes in justifvi 
this FTG. First, as we saw already, Plato thinks that inner harmony fulfills 
our human functioning, or "ergon". Secondly, as his description of education 
in hi^ Cave-analogy show«, inner harmony realizes freedom, for a person with 
inner harmony is free to realize ends that he chooses on reflexion, and i<= 
free to change in directions deemed valuable. Thirdly, such a person achieves 
selfsufficiency (LYSIS 215a) since he not dependent for his welfare on 
accidental environmental features, or on the opinions of others.
Our analysis of Plato's STG showed that from the point of view of eros 
the objects are always analyzed as merely coinstantiations of attribute«-^.
It is important to note, however, that from the point of view of erás the 
self too is analyzed this way. Plato does not give different analyses for 
respect for others and self respect, or admiration of others and admiration 
of the self. If I approve og myself or respect mvself, or love myself, 
this must be - if warranted - in virtue of my possessing a restricted set of 
attributes, This means, however, that the same steps apply as in the case 
of other objects. Thus the adoption of the Platonic attitudes lea^s to a 
conception of the self according to which the self is transformed into a mere 
set of coinstantiations ylft as much as other objects are. ^his should change 
our ways of interpreting "wanting something for myself". For once the Platonic 
attitudes are adopted, this will amount to saying that I want instantiations 
of certain Forms in such a way that these should be causally related to a
sPöcial "bundle of qualities" namely myself. But once it is put that 
we see_why Plato would regard such a restriction as arbitrary. If the 
attributes m  question do have objeotive worth,why shouW thelr instantiations
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be related to a set of coinstantiations to which they happen to have a 
causal link? If the attitude is warranted, then I should want to have the 
object have as many instantiations as possible, regardless of their contingent 
causal relations. Self-interest becomes in this way transformed into interest 
in the Good and its parts and instances. This is the deepest aspect of Plato’s 
"reason rules" principle.
Evidence for this interpretation is provided not only by the fact that 
we can read the relevant passages in the SYMPOSIUM and the REPUBLIC in a more 
satisfactory way, but also directly by REPUBLIC 5^?h7-c^, where Pla+o makes i+ 
clear that the emergence of interest in the self and the accompanying possessi 
veness is caused by the abadonment of reason. This is, once more stfctn^ fe. 
to the modern ear. We tend to associate reason and self interest, and not to 
oppose them. ButBWe see that by "rationality" Plato means the conceptions of 
self and other objects that was sketched above, then this passage makes good 
sense. Once I stop seeing myself and other objects of eros as "bundles of 
qualities", I ts see them as the unreflective person would? the self is a 
center of individuality, and other objects become important because of their 
alleged uniqueness that they have for me in view of my interactions with /them.
Once we see these implications of the Platonic psychology, we can 
solve two-.groblems set by the interesting analysis of eros provided by 
G. Santas’1- . Oirçe of these concerns the thesis that ero® indicates deficiency. 
Now it is true that initially the person who develops eros towards something 
feels a deficiency in himself. But by the time his attitudes are trans­
formed in the manner outlined above, the deficiency too is generalized, and 
is construed as the world lacking sufficient numbers of instances of the 
object of eras. Again, there might be - on the surface - a conflict between 
eros towards obtaining something, and the eros of keeping what we wanted.
But the truly Platonic eros dissolves this distinction. "Obtaining” starts 
the process, but by the time we moved through SI - S^, what we want i^ mofe 
instances of the object? and this amounts to both obtaining more of the afform 
in this world and mainlining it.
In conclusion one should note the incomplete character of +he ethics 
that falls out of Plato's rTG and the close link he envisages be+ween this and 
matters of obligation. We are not told how to resolve conflicts between 
different goods, or between different realizations of the same good. We are 
not told anything about how to distribute goods, and we are not given anv grou 
for rights. It i^ not clear how Plato would handle rational wishes for 
something that we want instantiated only in rare cases. For example, one 
might want a certain type of doctor or teacher to exist without wanting it 
to be the case that every doctor or teacher should be like that. One would 
have to go much beyond the Platonic texts to construct an ethics that deals 
with all of these issues. Even if such a reconstruction were to be made, 
we might find that muerh of ethics would be autonomous in the sense that it 
would have no close link to Plato's STG.
There are a few arguments towards the end of Book IX about the STg lead in 
to a pleasant life. We have seen already that this can be taken in at leas+ 
two . If Plato were to argue that there is a general notion of pleasure,
in terms of which the Platonic human has more of this than humans with other 
STG's, then this would have to be a separate argument, independent of the 
justification of the ^TG. The construction of the REPUBLIC! i* like the 
dialectical construction of other dialogues such as the MENO, PHAEDO, "YMPOSIU 
and ^OPHIST. The dome-like structure indicates that the deepest theories form 
the inner core of the dialogue, and that what is in the beginning and the 
end are on a more concrete and common sensical level. Hence one should not 
attribute too much importance to these - clearly inadequate - arguments aboV't 
pleasure at the end·11.
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We should note now that Plato is not only proposing a new way of doinsr 
ethics hut is also addressing a major question in classical Greek thought.
As Irwin pointed out1^ the Greeks before Plato were already interested in the 
question of how to relate one's own interest with the public good. Plato's 
answer is neither a Kantian nor a utilitarian one. His answer is that this 
way of phrasing a question about ourselves and others presupposes a false 
conception of the self and of the human STG. When we come to understand our­
selves adequately and develop the adeqaaèe STG, the original question 
dissolves into a demand for efforts towards instantiating the Good, whenever 
and wherever possible.
Stanford University Julius M. Moravcsik
NOTES
♦Many of the ideas contained, in thijr paper originated in mv "On What We Aim at 
and How We Live" in The Greeks and the Good Life ed. D. Depew,, Hackett, 
Indianapolis I98O pp.198-235· I am indebted for very helpful criticism of 
that paper by T. Irwin and Kurt Baier; the final version received further 
helpful comments from Michael Bratmari.
1. The multiple significance of Tharsymachus’ claim has been recognized by 
Julia Annas, though she gives a different interpretation from what is
proposed below. cee Julia Annas An Introduction to Plato's REPUBLIC. Oxford 
University Press I98I pp. 36-37
2 . One can compare this to the emotive theory of ethics. Such a theorv does 
not attempt to give a synonym for 'good', but rather explains its use by 
claiming that its primary function is to express some emotion or attitude.
3. John Rawls A Theorv of Justice Harvard University Press, 1971·
b. The difficulties of interpreting Pqato as either a utilitarian or a Kantian 
cen be seen from the work by J.D. Mabbott "Is Plato's REPUBLIC Utilitarian? 
Originally in Mind 1937. reprinted in Modern Studies in Philosophy; Plato 
vol. II. Doubleday, New York, 1971 ΡΡ·57-65· ! ,
5· This is also Rawls' strategy. He explicates the notion of primary or basic 
good, and then shows that this is compatible with fairness, leads to stabil 
in society, etc.
6. Though much of this material derives from my earlier work on the SYMP0CIUM, 
this particular point has escaped me in my earlier work. See J. Moravcsik 
"Reason and Eros in the Ascent-Passage of the SYMPOSIUM" in Assays in 
Ancient Greek Philosophy ed. John Anton and Beorsie Kustas Albany N.Y.
I97I pp.285-302
7. The claim seems more natural if we assume a mass-term interpretation of 
moral Forms at this stage; or at least a failure to distinguish the mass 
from the count term interpretation. I am indebted at this point to discussi· 
with Nicholas Denyer.
8 . On this view the Good is not at. the top of a hierarchy of all object·* of' 
satisfaction. Rather, it is a magnet 4hat gives the proper orientation and 
hence meaning for human lives. For a different view see T. Irwin Plato * s
Moral Theorv Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977 PP· 51-52 and p.22^.
9 . This point was made in my earlier work on the SYMPOSIUM (see above) and in 
some of the writings of Gregory Vlastos. But it is important to see that 
thi* is a claim about how we see objects within the erotic attitude. It is 
not a metaphysical claim; in order to assess Plato's ontology of the indi­
vidual, one would have to bring in passages from the TIMAEU?.
10. Gerasimos Santas "Plato on Love, Beautv and the Good" in Dspew ed. Op.cit. 
pp. 33-68.
11. For a more sympathetic treatment of these arguments see Julia Annas op,cit.
pp. 307-309.
12. T. Irwin Op.cit. pp. I6-I7.
